Gogoratu, krisitik ateratzeko, eskari agregatua dela giltza[1].
1. Stephanie Kelton: 10 galdera eta erantzun
Gogoratu Kelton-ek esandakoa[2].
Euroa onartzean, EBko herrialde guztiak moneta erabiltzaile bilakatu ziren. EBko herrialdeek moneta, euroa bereganatzen dute zergak bilduz.
Arazoa: ekonomia murrizten ari denean, estatu kutxetara etortzen den dirua jaitsi egiten da, zerga bilketa behera baitoa.
Zergak jaisten diren une berean, gobernu ordainketak handituz doaz, segurtasun programak martxan direlako: langabeziarako laguntzak eta abar. Horrek defizita handitu egiten du.
Beraz, EBn gobernu horiek kanpora jo dute euroa maileguz hartzeko, monetaren eskasia hori estaltzearren[3].
Orain gobernu horiek mailegutan hartu nahi dute euroa. Finantza merkatuek ongi dakite EBko gobernuek ezin dutela eurorik jaulki; ondorioz, gobernuek ordaintze ezean egon behar dute. Beraz, mailegu-emaileek sari handiago bat jartzen dute.
Gaur egun EBk daraman bidetik, ez da aurreikusten inongo irtenbiderik EBko gobernu horien zorra zuritzeko. Gainera, ordaintzeko epeak luzatzen direnean edo eta birfinantzatzen ahalegintzen direnean, mailegatzeko prozesuan euroak gero eta gehiago hartuz, interes tasak gero eta handiago bilakatuz doaz, mailegu-emaileek sari handiagoak eskatuz.
2. Stephnie Kelton-en hitzaldia
Gogoratu Kelton-en hitzaldia[4].
(Ohar pare bat: current account[5], euskarazko kontu korronteko balantza[6]; balance of trade[7], euskarazko balantza komertzial edo merkataritzako balantza[8].)
Diapositibetan horrela azaltzen dira zenbait datu:
a) Kontu korronteko defizitak Europan: 17 herrialdeetatik 14 herrialdetan (ikus 18. diapositiba)
b) Alemaniak lehiakortasuna apurtu zuen (ikus 19. diapositiba)
Hona Alemaniaren garaipena:
1996ko kontu korrontea (20. diapositiba)
1997ko kontu korrontea (21. diapositiba)
1998ko kontu korrontea (22. diapositiba)
1999ko kontu korrontea (23. diapositiba)
2000eko kontu korrontea (24. diapositiba)
2001eko kontu korrontea (25. diapositiba)
2002ko kontu korrontea (26. diapositiba) —> Ikus Alemania
2003ko kontu korrontea (27. diapositiba) —> Ikus Alemania
2004ko kontu korrontea (28. diapositiba) —> Ikus Alemania
2005eko kontu korrontea (29. diapositiba) —> Ikus Alemania
2006ko kontu korrontea (30. diapositiba) —> Ikus Alemania
2007ko kontu korrontea (31. diapositiba) —> Ikus Alemania
2008ko kontu korrontea (32. diapositiba) —> Ikus Alemania
2009ko kontu korrontea (33. diapositiba) —> Ikus Alemania
2010eko kontu korrontea (34. diapositiba) —> Ikus Alemania
2011ko kontu korrontea (35. diapositiba) —> Nork irabazi zuen?
Hortaz, EBri irtenbide duin bat emateko, beste bide bat topatu behar da.
3. EBrako irtenbide duinerantz
Hona hemen zantzu batzuk:
a) Mosler-en planak EBZ ongi eta zuzen erabiltzeko[9].
b) Mosler bonoak[10].
Moler bonoak: Eurokide diren estatuek jaulkitzen dituzten bonoen antzekoak dira. Desberdintasun bakarra, eta funtsezkoa, hauxe da: ordainketa ezean, Mosler bonoak gehi interesak beraiek jaulki dituen gobernuari edozein unetan zergak ordaintzeko erabil daitezke. Horrek balioa segurtatuko die bono horien edukitzaileei, interes tasa lehiakorretan gobernuari bere burua finantzatzen ahalbidetuz.
4. Zergak bermatzen dituzten bonoak
Eman diezaiogun begirada azkar bat Mosler-en azken lantxoari[11].
Zergak bermatzen dituzten bonoak dira, edo, jadanik ikusi dugunez, Mosler bonoak. Baina lantxo horretan, zehaztasun gehiago azaltzen dira.
Lantxoan, Mosler-ek honelako puntuak ukitzen ditu:
(i) Lehen esan bezala, gobernu bono estandarrak bezalakoak dira, baina klausula berezi batekin[12].
(ii) Irtenbide horrek EBko herrialde kideei ahalbidetzen die beren subiranotasunari eustea[13].
(iii) Krisiaren kausak ezagunak dira[14].
(iv) Inbertsiogileek aktibo seguruak bilatzen dituzte[15].
(v) EBko gobernuek bono berri bat jaulkiko dute, gobernu zor berri bat, zergak bermatzen dituen bonoa[16].
(vi) Bono berriak ez dira inoiz erabiliko zergak berrordaintzeko[17].
(vii) Bono horiek zergak ordaintzeko erabiltzen badira, iruzurrak alboratzeko hona hemen caveat[18].
Inbertsiogileei beti segurtatzen zaielako bono horiek diru ‘onak’ direla, bi ondorio on aipatzen ditu Mosler-ek:
(a) Bonoen gaineko interes tasak jaistea, eta
(b) Herrialdeak ez bideratzea ordaintze ezean egoteko.
Zergatik ez da martxan jarri EBn horrelako irtenbide duin era erraza? Zertan ari dira EBko politikariak eta ekonomialariak?
Eta Euskal Herrian, zer? Zertan ari gara gu?
[2] Ikus http://www.modernmoneyandpublicpurpose.com/uploads/1/2/5/3/12534585/10q.pdf. Eta euskaraz hauxe: https://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2013/02/04/hamar-galdera-eta-erantzun/.
[3] EBn gertatzen ari denaren aurka, gogoratu Mosler-en planak EBZ ongi eta zuzen erabiltzeko: https://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2012/05/21/warren-mosler-en-proposamenak/.
[4] Ikus http://www.slideshare.net/DevinDSmith/pk-conference-2012-final-revision50?ref=. Halaber, ikus http://www.slideshare.net/MitchGreen/mmt-basics-you-cannot-consider-the-deficit-in-isolation.
[6] Ikus http://lizeoa.com/ekonomia%20ikertzen/nazioarteko%20merkataritza/testuak/Ordainketa%20Balantza.htm.
[9] Ikus https://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2012/05/21/warren-mosler-en-proposamenak/.
[10] Ikus https://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2011/10/07/europar-batasuneko-eta-ebko-estatu-desberdinetako-bonoak-mosler-bonoak/.
[12] “…Tax-backed bonds would be similar to standard government bonds except that they would contain a clause stating that if the country issuing the bonds does not make its payments—and only if the country does not make its payments— the tax-backed bonds would be acceptable to make tax payments within the country in question, and would continue to earn interest.”
[13] “…Such a solution would allow individual countries to maintain their sovereignty and return to the markets so that they no longer have to rely on the rest of Europe for bailouts. At the same time, we must also ensure that the single currency remains intact.”
[14] Gogoratzeko, ingelesez: “…The root of the debt crisis can be found in the fact that investors are currently concerned about the government debt of countries in the euro zone periphery. They are concerned that these countries might default and that investors would consequently lose their money. This causes investors to demand a higher “yield,” or interest rate, on such government bonds. But when interest rates rise too high, the country in question suffers under the burden of hefty interest payments, which may push that country into a situation in which it is unable to repay its creditors. In such a case, the debtor country may then ask its neighbors for a bailout, either through a fund set up especially for such a bailout or by requesting that the central bank buy up some of their debt in the secondary market. Both of the above scenarios have already occurred and have caused tension and strife across Europe.”
[15] “What investors seek is assurance that they will be paid back. In the markets, this is referred to as “creditworthiness.” Investors seek out safe assets that they believe to be “money good.” Therefore, what we must do is give peripheral debt a high degree of safety while (1) allowing peripheral countries to remain users of the euro and (2) ensuring that the European Central Bank does not need to step in as lender of last resort.”
[16] “…a simple solution to this problem would be to have the peripheral countries begin issuing a new type of government debt. We call this type of debt a “tax-backed bond.” Tax-backed bonds would be similar to current government bonds except that they would contain a clause stating that if the country failed to make its payments when due—and only if this happens—the tax-backed bonds would be acceptable to make tax payments within the country in question.”
[17] “…since this tax backing would set an absolute floor below which the value of the asset could not fall, and because the bonds pay a fair rate of interest, there would be no risk of actual loss and no reason to part with them—and, hence, the bonds might never be used to repay taxes.”
[18] Caveat: “…someone would have to attempt to use his or her bonds for tax payment and the government would have to claim that no payment had been made and prosecute that taxpayer for nonpayment of taxes. To ensure this does not occur, we advocate that bonds be written under United Kingdom (international) law. That would mean the government would have no legal standing to make such a claim. The yields on the new bonds would then be set by markets. We believe that these yields would reflect the low risk associated with the new bonds and would be significantly below the yields currently being demanded by the markets. (We advise issuing the bonds with an interest rate set at the Euro Interbank Offered Rate plus 3 percent on a floating basis, and then letting the market adjust the price from there.)”
