1. Gordailu zerga
Gordailu zerga modan jarri da (dute) eta erakargarriagoa beste zerga igoerak eta gastu murrizketak baino, nahiz eta deflaziogilea izan, eta orokorki banku sistema desorekatu[1].
Hala ere, Zipren, zenbait negoziazio eta gero, akordio batera iritsi zen[2].
2. Interes tasa negatiboa
Zipren proposatutako gordailu zerga funtzionalki interes tasa negatibo bat da[3].
3. Finantza beharrak eta iturriak
Ez soilik Zipre, Europa osoa Errusiaren mende dago hainbat gaitan, gasan eta gasolioan barne[4].
4. Cypress Popular Bank
Banku gordailuak zergatzeak esan nahi du banku maileguak ez direla ordainduak izan.
Hona Mosler-en hitzez[5], Zipreri dgokionez.
Datu gordinetan:
70 x 109 inguru gordailu totalean
Haietatik, 30 x 109 inguru ‘ez egoile’ izanik
Gutxi gora behera 9 x 109 behar dira birkapitalizatzeko. Baldin eta kapital ratioak %10 izateko badira, kapital berri osoa 7 x 109 izango da. Horrek esan nahi du banku sistemaren kapitala[6] (galera netoa) negatiboa dela: 2 x 109.
Gordailu asko irten dira, eta horrek bankuek Banku Zentraletik maileguz hartzea ekarri dute[7].
Ondorioz, gordailugilearen palanka-efektua dator, zuk nire banku gordailuak zergatzen dituzu eta zure mailegu batzuk ez dira ordainduak izan.
Hortaz, ez da ezer irabazten, eta gauza asko galdu daiteke[8].
Dena den, horrela segitzen du Mosler-ek: This is all likely far from over.
5. Mosler-en soluzioa Ziprerako eta Europarako
Hona hemen Mosler-ek dioena[9].
Lehendabizi, hona Ziprerako proposamena[10]:
EBZk Zipreko banku gordailuak bermatzen ditu, urteko kuota % 0,25 izanik.
EBZk Zipreko bankuetarako erregulatzea bere gain hartzen du, baita gainbegiratzea, bankugintzako arautegien betearaztea, eta abar ere.
Horixe bilakatzen da EBko banku guztiak erregulatzeko modeloa.
Aipatu bezala, 70 x 109 inguru aktiboekin, Zipreko banku sistemak kapital negatiboa dauka, 2 x 109 inguru, edo aktibotan % 3 inguru[11].
EBZko gordailu aseguruarekin, likidezia arazoa desagertzen da.
Beraz, mailegutan, 10 x 109 ingurukoak ez dira aplikagarriak, baita hainbat erregulatzaileren rola desagertu[12] ere.
Gainera, fondoen kostuak behera doaz; beraz, interes netoen marjinak zabaldu, barneko kapital berreraiketa bultzatuz.
EBZren erregulazioak hainbat neurri dauzka barne, bankuen oraingo egoera berezia kontuan edukiz[13]. Baita kapital ez nahikoa dagoeneko baldintzatan[14] ere.
EBZk, banku zentral guztiek bezala, azkenean banku gordailu guztiak segurtatuko ditu, baita erregulazioa ere.
Zipre aukera bat da, EBZren gainontzeko banku kideetara arazoa hedatu baino lehen[15].
[1] Ikus http://softcurrencyeconomics.com/2013/03/17/cyprus-agrees-to-euro-zone-bailout-package-that-includes-a-deposit-tax/.
[2] Ikus http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/17/business/global/cyprus-agrees-to-euro-zone-bailout-package.html?hp&_r=2&. Ingelesez: “…a one-time tax of 9.9 percent on Cypriot bank deposits of more than $130,000, or 100,000 euros, and a tax of 6.75 percent on smaller deposit.”
[3] Ikus http://moslereconomics.com/2013/03/19/cyprus-just-in-case-you-thought-negative-interest-rates-help-an-economy/.
Cyprus- Just in case you thought negative interest rates help an economy
Ingelesez: “Many have proposed negative interest rates as further ‘easing’ to help the economy.(too many, actually)
The proposed deposit tax in Cypress is functionally a one time negative interest rate. So maybe if they made it annual- just like the negative interest rates proposed elsewhere- it would help the economy?
So as previously discussed, I still see it in a spectrum. Positive rates are a govt subsidy and negative interest rates are a tax.”
[5] Ikus http://softcurrencyeconomics.com/2013/03/21/cypress-popular-bank-taxing-bank-deposits-means-that-bank-loans-do-not-get-paid/.
[6] Ingelesez: “When the banks take in deposits they have the funds and buy assets.”
[7] Ingelesez: “Lots of deposits have exited which has caused the banks to borrow from the CB vs ‘eligible collateral’ at the Bank of Cypress, an ECB ‘branch’ under ELA (emergency lending).”
[8] Ingelesez. “I’m guessing there’s a good chance the non resident deposits are tied to loans to related parties of the depositors. That’s how it’s done – I give you a billion in deposits and you lend my company/friends/etc. a billion or 2 billion. Not to mention the reverse – my company makes a deposit and you loan me the funds. x2. etc
That gives the depositor leverage – you start taxing my bank deposits and some of your loans don’t get paid.
So nothing’s gained, and a lot could be lost.” (Oharra: Amerikar bilioia = 109.)
[11] Eta horrela segitzen du Mosler-ek: “And that no doubt includes markdowns on EU member nation debt that ’goes away’ with the ECB ‘doing what it takes’ to sustain solvency.”
[12] Ingelesez: “With ECB deposit insurance, the liquidity issue goes away. So the approx 10 billion in loans won’t be applicable and ‘regulatory forbearance’ can then obviate the need for the rest of the proposed and highly controversial and problematic ‘rescue package’.”
[13] Ingelesez: “ECB regulation will include ‘regulatory forbearance’ where the banks are allowed to operate with current levels of negative capital under strict ‘tarp like’ terms and conditions- no dividends, salary and bonus controls, credit quality criteria, etc. etc. and not to neglect thorough investigations into criminal activity and prosecution.”
[14] Ingelesez: “When capital ratios are brought into compliance with BASIL levels either through earnings and/or raising new equity the ECB can remove the ‘special requirements and restrictions’ imposed due to insufficient capital.”
[15] Ingelesez: “The ECB, like all central banks, will ultimately insure all bank deposits and also do the regulation. It’s already pretty much doing this indirectly. Cyprus is an opening to do it directly, and get the process down there first before expanding to the rest of the ECB’s member banks.”
