Ikus Osteguna... (segida)1
Albisteak
How Greece Has Fallen Victim To “Economic Hit Men”
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-02/how-greece-has-fallen-victim-economic-hit-men
Greek Banks To Run Out Of Physical Cash “In A Matter Of Days”
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-02/greek-banks-run-out-physical-cash-matter-days
NSA Leak Reveals Both Merkel And Schauble Saw Greek Debt As Unsustainable Even After Haircut
Ostiraleko albisteak
The German Press Does It Again: “Give Me The Money Or I Shoot”
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-02/german-press-does-it-again-give-me-money-or-i-shoot
Martin Armstrong: Troika Is Maneuvering To Rig The Greek Referendum
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-02/martin-armstrong-troika-maneuvering-rig-greek-referendum
The Complete Greek Referendum Walk-Thru: When, How, What To Expect; And What Comes Next
The Troika Turns Europe Into A Warzone
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-03/troika-turns-europe-warzone
Contagion Continues: Italy, Spain Stocks Tumble To Post-Greferendum Lows
Good On You, Greece – But Don’t Waver Now (Part 2)
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-03/good-you-greece-don%E2%80%99t-waver-now-part-2
What It All Comes Down To On Sunday
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-03/what-it-all-comes-down-sunday
European Parliament president Martin Schulz calls for regime change in Greece. Are we seeing a financially engineered coup?
Greeks Split On Greferendum As Credit Suisse Says “No” Vote Defies “Rationality”
US Pushed For IMF Greek Haircut Study Release After Euro ‘Allies’ Tried To Block
Massive “No” Demonstration Floods Athens’ Syntagma Square As Tsipras Speaks – Live Webcast
Fearing Spillover, ECB Moves To Shield Neighboring Banks From Greek Meltdown
RANsquawk Weekend in Focus Video – Could the Greek referendum trigger a Grext?
Greek Banks Considering 30% Haircut On Deposits Over €8,000: FT
Greece Has Spent A Half-Century In Default Or Restructuring
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-03/greece-has-spent-half-century-default-or-restructuring
Azken berriak
Zuzenean eta tartekorik gabe, Greziari buruzko azken berriez jabetzeko linka, ingelesez: http://www.ekathimerini.com/news
Erreferendumaz hitz bi
Afera ez da erreferendumean ezetz botatzea, zeren jende askok eta ospetsu askotxok horrelako botoa eskatu baitute…
Afera hauxe da: nahiz eta ezetza atera, gero zer?
Bill Mitchell-ek2: I hope they vote no and then realise that leaving the dysfunctional Eurozone will promise them growth and a return to some prosperity.
Kontua da jende askok, gehiegik ez dakitela funtsean sistema monetarioak nola funtzionatzen duen.
W. Mosler-ek3:
“Aipatu dena bere sistema monetario ulertzen ez duen mundua da, barne bankugintza ulertzen ez duten banku zentraleko bankariak, baita mass media nagusia, politikari guztiak eta beraien finantza ministroak ere, azkenak hitz eginez eta ergel handiarena eginez beraien hautesleen kaltetan, zeintzuek ez baitute afera ongi ulertzen, eta ez dira ohartzen daukaten trebetasun falta izugarriaz.
Bien bitartean, makromailan, politika deflaziogileak ondokoak dauzka barne: tasa negatiboak, QE, fiskalitate estu, erreforma estrukturalak, eta berarekin doan guztia. Eta zorren ordaintze ezak, baldin eta gertatzen badira, deflaziogileak ere dira. Eta joera deflaziogile hori guztia erakusten dute merkatu prezio gehienek ere.”
Bai, Troikaren helburua argi dago4: defizit publikoa martxan jarri barik, kanpo merkataritza superabitak edukitzea nahi dute neoliberalek, enpresa erraldoien esportazioak bultzatuz.
Baina neoliberalen Europar Batasunerako (EB) proiektua aspalditik dator, Bill Mitchell-ek erakutsi duenez: Europe’s US imported nightmare5.
Irakur Mitchell-en zenbait zipriztin ondoko linkean6.
Linkean ikus daitezke EBko gaurko marko makroekonomikoa ulertzeko urrats nagusiak. Hasieran proiektatuta zegoen “a strong fiscal presence at the federal level” desagertu zen, langabeziaren kezka alboratuz.
Greziako erreferendumean ezetza emateak eta lortzeak ez du suposatzen austeritatearekin bukatuko dela. Austeritatearekin bukatzeko beste neurri ekonomiko desberdin batzuk hartu behar dira: hasteko defizit publiko handitzea (%3tik %8ra).
Syrizako liderrek behin eta berriz esan dute beraiek eurogunean egoten segitu nahi dutela. Ongi dakigunez, eurogunean egotea eta austeritatearekin bukatzea zirkulu karratuaren bila abiatzea bezain ezinezko asmakeria da.
Beraz, erreferendumaren emaitza edozein delarik, Greziak infernuak segituko du. Zoritxarrez, horixe izango da azken emaitza.
(Hala ere, badakigu EBrako eta, zehazki, Greziarako irtenbiderik egon badagoela. Sarrera gisa, ikus DTM hasiberrientzat7.)
2 Ikus Osteguna… (segida): https://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/07/02/osteguna-segida/.
3 Ikus Astelehena …(segida): https://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/07/01/asteazkena-segida/.
6 Ingelesez: “(i) In (…) Eurozone Dystopia: Groupthink and Denial on a Grand Scale (…) I examined the evolution of the monetary union from the late 1940s and traced it in terms of the ideas that underpinned the various policy proposals. (ii) The Project began at a time when the advanced nations had embraced a broad Keynesian economic policy consensus with governments committed to sustaining full employment. (iii) The broad political and economic consensus that emerged after the war brought very low levels of unemployment in most Western nations, which persisted until the mid 1970s. (iv) The 1970 Werner Report outlined a comprehensive timetable for the creation of a full economic and monetary union by the end of the decade. (v) The MacDougall Committee in 1975 also emphasised that an effective economic and monetary union would require a strong fiscal presence at the federal level. (vi) The Werner Report was not implemented because of the growing currency instability the French fear of German dominance and their unwillingness cede power to supranational institutions, combined with the German inflation obsession, stood in the way. (vii) The surge in Monetarist thought within macroeconomics in the 1970s, first within the US academy, then in policy making and central banking domains around the globe, quickly morphed into an insular Groupthink, which trapped policy makers in the thrall of the self regulating, free market myth. (viii) The American intellectual invasion of Europe in the 1970s was not a qualitative improvement – rather a race-to-the-bottom of ignorance and ideological supremacy for neo-liberal ideas. (viii) The Europeans imported these inferior economic ideas and analytical techniques via their young PhD students as they returned home to take positions in government, central banking and in other places of influence. (ix) The accompanying ‘confirmation bias’, which is ‘the tendency of people to only notice information consistent with their own expectations and to ignore information that is inconsistent with them’ overwhelmed the debate about monetary integration. (x) The introduction of the Monetarist inspired Barre Plan in 1976. (xi) Across Europe, unemployment became a policy tool aimed at maintaining price stability rather than a policy target, as it had been during the Keynesian era up until the mid 1970s. (xii) The Delors Report (1989), which informed the Maastricht conference, disregarded the conclusions of the Werner and MacDougall Reports about the need for a strong federal fiscal function because they represented ‘old fashioned’ Keynesian thinking, which was no longer tolerable within the Monetarist Groupthink that had taken over European debate. (xiii) The Monetarist (neo-liberal) disdain for government intervention meant that the EMU would suppress the capacity of fiscal policy and no amount of argument or evidence, which indicated that such a choice would lead to crisis. (xiv) The Eurozone is now locked down in a straitjacket of economic austerity, driven by an economic ideology that is blind to the evidence of its own failure. (xv) The neo-liberal policies of deregulation and the demonisation of the use of discretionary fiscal deficits (government spending greater than tax revenue) created the crisis in the first place, and now the same sorts of policies are prolonging it. (xvi) Millions of European workers are now unemployed, youth jobless rates are around 60 per cent in some advanced nations, inequality and poverty rates are rising, and massive daily losses of national income are being endured. (xvii) They [the Europeans] failed to grasp that the US President floated the US dollar and abandoned any notion of convertibility – that is, in August 1971 the US dollar became a true fiat currency and the US government inherited significant federal capacity to maintain economic growth and low unemployment.”
