Mercouris-ek puntuz puntu ukatzen ditu aurreko baieztapen guztiak:

1) Desinformazioa¹¹

1 ESM: European Stability Mechanism: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Stability_Mechanism.

2 Troika rebranded? Greece’s creditors are now calling themselves the “Quadriga” to note the inclusion of the ESM: http://redpilltimes.com/troika-rebranded-greeces-creditors-are-now-calling-themselves-the-quadriga-to-note-the-inclusion-of-the-esm/.

3 Ikus Greziako irteeraz (Grexit delakoaz), zenbait iritzi: https://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/07/24/greziako-irteeraz-grexit-delakoaz-zenbait-iritzi/.

4 Ikus aurreko oharrean dauden iruzkinak.

5 Ikus http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2015/07/yanis-varoufakis-full-transcript-our-battle-save-greece.

6 Ikus http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/2015/07/27/varoufakis-unplugged-the-london-call-transcript/.

7  IT matters and Greece: http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=31441#more-31441.

8 Ikus Statement by Yanis Varoufakis on the FinMin’s Plan B Working Group & the parallel payment system: http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2015/07/27/statement-by-yanis-varoufakis-on-the-finmins-plan-b-working-group-the-parallel-payment-system/.

9 Ikus Professor James K. Galbraith’s statement on the Ministry of Finance Working Group convened by former finance minister Yanis Varoufakis: http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2015/07/27/professor-james-k-galbraiths-statement-on-the-ministry-of-finance-working-group-convened-by-former-finance-minister-yanis-varoufakis.

10 Ikus Getting to the truth behind modern day mythology. Beware the tall tales coming out of Greece: http://redpilltimes.com/getting-to-the-truth-behind-modern-day-mythology-beware-the-tall-tales-coming-out-of-greece/.

11 Ingelesez: “Ever since the latest bailout agreement, misinformation to justify it has been pouring out of Greece. Much of this centres on the impracticability of supposed plans for a Grexit and of the “revolutionary” nature of the individuals who hatched them.”

12 Ingelesez: “… they are already 80% state owned. “Nationalising” the banks would not therefore have been an act of revolutionary confiscation or of appropriation of private property. It would have simply meant the state taking operational control of the banks by replacing their managements by new managements appointed by and accountable directly to the government.”

13 Ingelesez: “Nothing could be further from the truth. Far from the introduction of a new currency being something that would have been resisted across Greece and Europe, we know it would have had the backing of the German Finance Ministry, of Wolfgang Schauble and of the IMF.

According to the British writer Tariq Ali, as long ago as February Schauble was offering Varoufakis 50 billion euros and help with an orderly Grexit. Tariq Ali describes the offer in this way:

“It is now known that Schäuble offered an amicable, organised Grexit and a cheque for 50 billion euros. This was refused on the grounds that it would seem to be a capitulation. This is bizarre logic. It would have preserved Greek sovereignty, and if Syriza had taken charge of the Greek banking system a recovery could have been planned on its terms. The offer was repeated later. ‘How much do you want to leave the Eurozone?’ Schäuble asked Varoufakis just before the referendum. Again Schäuble was snubbed. Of course the Germans made the offer for their own reasons, but a planned Grexit would have been far better for Greece than what has happened.”

No one in Greece is denying this story and in fact I am told it is true.”

14 Ingelesez: “…. I said that the claim that Putin rejected a request from Tsipras for $10 billion is – as the Russians say – pure fantasy. We now have indirect confirmation of this from what must ultimately be a Greek source (the one that gave the story to Tariq Ali). Why would Tsipras ask Putin for $10 billion to fund a Grexit when Schauble was offering him 50 billion euros to do the same?”

15 Ingelesez: “Even as late as the latest EU summit the option of an orderly Grexit was on the table. Schauble – with Merkel’s (alas temporary) backing – actually proposed it. If the Greeks had agreed to it, it would have happened. The IMF, which has made known its complete lack of belief in the viability of the latest bailout, would have backed it.

Greece would have got its 50 billion euros to help it support the new currency, Schauble and the Germans would have ensured that the ECB provided the necessary liquidity to the banks to keep the banks operating until the new currency was ready, the banks could have been nationalised by mutual agreement – there being as I have said nothing revolutionary about this – capital controls would have been imposed until the new currency was ready (the Germans agreed to this when Cyprus imposed them, so why would they refuse it if sought by Greece?) and control of the Bank of Greece, the mint and the revenue service would have been transferred back to the Greek government as an indispensable element in an orderly and agreed Grexit.”

16 Ingelesez: “The Financial Times in its hit piece says the process of introducing a new currency would have taken 6-8 months, which is much less than the 18 months Varoufakis has claimed.

Actually that is far too pessimistic. The former British cabinet minister John Redwood has guesstimated it would have taken no more than 3 months. In my opinion, given financial help from the EU and the IMF and technical support e.g. from Russia, the whole process could have been carried out from beginning to end in the space of a few weeks.

Once Greece was out of the eurozone it could have agreed – if it wanted – a formal restructuring as part of a package negotiated with the IMF (the alternative of a default on the entire debt might have done irreparable damage to relations with the creditor countries). The conditions would doubtless have been tough but they would hardly have amounted to the psychopathic agreement we have now. With Greece outside the eurozone and able to regain competitiveness through a devaluation there would have been a real chance that whatever was agreed would succeed.”

17 Ingelesez: “… the reality has to be faced: a Grexit did not happen not because it was difficult to do but because the Syriza government didn’t want it.

All claims to the contrary are fairy tales, whilst the malicious spreading of stories about the various plans that were hatched in the desperate final hours before Greece’s final capitulation is being done purposefully by those who want to discredit the idea of a Grexit and those who support it.”

18 Izan ere, “Varoufakis has in fact now admitted that the real Plan B if the negotiations for a debt write-off failed was not a Grexit – his claims to have prepared for one is so much smoke and mirrors – but a resignation of the government and the formation of a “government of national unity” consisting of the old oligarchic pro-EU parties to sign a bailout package in place of Syriza. In Varoufakis’s own words:

“We are going to do all it takes to bring home a financially viable agreement. We will compromise but not be compromised. We will step back just as much as is needed to secure an agreement-solution within the Eurozone. However, if we are defeated by the catastrophic policies of the memorandum we shall step down and pass on the power to those who believe in such means; let them enforce those measures while we return to the streets.”

No word here of any plan for a Grexit.”

19 Ingelesez: “… a resignation of a government elected just a few months before to bring an end to austerity would have been an extraordinary act of abdication of responsibility.

Regardless it is not what Tsipras and Syriza did.

Instead of resigning when they failed to secure a debt write-off they chose to remain in power and negotiated for Greece an even worse deal than the one they had previously rejected.

Instead of admitting that Schauble offered him a dignified way out, Varoufakis is now also busy spreading a fantastic story that Schauble was throughout plotting to expel Greece from the eurozone so that he could terrorise France to accept the economic medicine he supposedly wants to impose on it. Varoufakis is actually claiming that Schauble told him as much.”

20 Ingelesez: “Varoufakis’s precise words are:

“Schauble believes that the eurozone is not sustainable as it is. He believes there has to be some fiscal transfers, some degree of political union. (…)

“And he said explicitly to me that a Grexit is going to equip him with sufficient terrorising power in order to impose upon the French, that which Paris has been resisting: a degree of transfer of budget making powers from Paris to Brussels.”

Does anybody seriously believe that if Schauble really did have such a plan he would have shared it with Varoufakis of all people?

The reality, as I have always said, is that Schauble adamantly opposes a debt write-off for Greece whilst it remains part of the eurozone not because he wants to terrorise France into submission but because of the disastrous precedent such a write-off might provide to other heavily indebted and bailed out eurozone states like Portugal, Spain, Cyprus and Ireland.

Obviously that is not sinister enough for Varoufakis – who has never shown the slightest understanding of Schauble’s position – which is why he attributes this bizarre plan to him.

Sad to say it seems Varoufakis was already spreading his fable about Schauble’s wicked plan to use Greece in order to terrorise France whilst the negotiations were actually underway – one reason surely why Schauble came to dislike him so much.”

21 Ingelesez: “In fairness to Tsipras, Varoufakis and Syriza, though their tactics were manipulative and duplicitous, their objective was always what they said it was: to keep Greece in the eurozone whilst securing an end to austerity and a debt write-off.

Most people – including me – assumed that as it became clear this was impossible they would drop the euro in order to end austerity and secure the debt write-off.”

22 Izan ere, “…I would ask people to keep a cool head in the face of all the nonsense that is now coming out of Greece. I am afraid that it is not without good reason we are known as the land of myths, legends and wondrous tales.“

23 Ikus https://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/page/2/.

24 Ikus W. Mosler-en China trade, Greece comment: http://moslereconomics.com/2015/07/13/china-trade-greece-comment/.