Albistea: Spain, QE chart, Wholesale trade, UK and France industrial production, Import and export prices1.
DTM Espainian: APEEP-k, hots, “Asociación para el Pleno Empleo y la Estabilidad de Precios” delakoak Espainiako jendeartean DTM hedatzea du helburu2.
APEEP eta Mosler3.
Eta Katalunian, zer?
Ikus:
(i) Una Catalunya independent crearia 475.000 nous llocs de feina i rebaixaria la taxa de desocupació al 7%, segons l’ANC4
“La Catalunya independent no tindria un dèficit fiscal …”
“… el 85% d’aquestes 475.000 noves ocupacions el crearien empreses privades bàsicament del sector de les infrastructures, la sanitat i l’educació.”
(ii) Comunicat del Col·lectiu Wilson davant de les Eleccions del 27-S5
“… eliminaria un dèficit fiscal molt gran i persistent – aquest dèficit és el que ara obliga la Generalitat a endeutar-se per fer front a les obligacions de despesa.”
“… aquest Estat fos plenament reconegut i operés com qualsevol altre país normal en el marc de la UE i dins de l’àrea de l’euro, i generar un balanç net negatiu…”
“El mateix podem dir de l’euro, que podria continuar sent utilitzat a Catalunya, tot garantint la continuïtat de l’actual règim de supervisió i accés a la liquiditat del sistema bancari, mitjançant un acord monetari com el que tenen Mònaco i altres microestats, però adaptat a les circumstàncies específiques del cas català, que inclouen el fet que ha adoptat l’euro des dels seus inicis i del desig de formar part eventualment de l’Eurosistema com a membre de ple dret (i, com a tal, de participar a les seves institucions).”
Zer ote da, arlo ekonomikoetan, bi proposamen horien azpian dagoena? Neoliberalismoa eta monetarismoa, besterik ez!6
Argi gera bedi:
(a) Kataluniar Errepublika independentearen alde gaude, erabat
(b) CUP izan liteke kataluniar estatu berri horren bultzatzailea7?
(c) Monetarismoan eta neoliberalismoan oinarritzen ez diren politika monetarioa eta fiskal berrien alde gaude, erabat, hots, DTM-ren alde.
(Gogora dezagun ondokoa: Moneta politika eta politika fiskala: bi eginkizun desberdin8.)
Eta Euskal Herrian, zer dago?
Arlo politikoan: Laugarren karlistada prestatzen? Euskal Penelope lotan, berriz?
Arlo ekonomikoan, zer?
Oraindik Syrizaren alde9?
Hola balitz, irakur linkean dagoena10, gutxienez desintoxikaziorako!
Edo/eta irakur ondoko elkarrizketa11.
1 Ikus http://moslereconomics.com/2015/09/10/spain-qe-chart-wholesale-trade-uk-and-france-industrial-production-import-and-export-prices/.
2 Ingeleses: “Asociación Para el Pleno Empleo y la Estabilidad de Precios (APEEP) (Association for Full Employment and Price Stability), is a non-profit organization devoted to raising awareness and disseminating Modern Monetary Theory amongst the Spanish public. APEEP believes that full employment and price stability are compatible if public policy is conducted within an MMT framework.”
3 Ingelesez: “… they will be hosting me for a presentation of the Spanish translation of “The Seven Deadly Innocent Frauds of Economic Policy”, starting with a presentation in Madrid on the 14th of September, Valencia on the 15th of September, and Vila-real on the 17th of September.
Here are links for the events, including time/date/location
14th September Madrid
15th September Valencia
17th September VilaReal
And this is the press release for the events containing more details.“
4 Ikus http://www.vilaweb.cat/noticies/una-catalunya-independent-crearia-475-000-nous-llocs-de-treball-i-deixaria-la-taxa-datur-en-el-7-segons-lanc/.
5 Ikus http://www.wilson.cat/ca/comunicats-conjunts/item/243-comunicat-col%C2%B7lectiu-wilson-eleccions-del-27-s-2015.html.
6 Ikus Kataluniaren txanda (5): https://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/08/10/kataluniaren-txanda-5/.
7 Ikus Katalunia, mon amour!: https://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/09/06/katalunia-mon-amour-2/.
8 Ikus https://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/09/05/moneta-politika-eta-politika-fiskala-bi-eginkizun-desberdin/.
9 Ikus Bakoitzari berea (omen da zuzenbidea). Halaber, ikus After Syriza: https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/08/greece-grexit-popular-unity-syriza/.
10 Ikus Introducing Popular Unity: https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/08/popular-unity-syriza-left-platform-lafazanis/
“As the recent disaster had abundantly demonstrated, these goals cannot be realized without exiting the eurozone and breaking with the whole set of policies institutionalized by the European Union.”
Halaber, ikus What Does Popular Unity Stand For?: https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/09/tsipras-popular-unity-syriza-eurozone-snap-elections/
“Exit from the monetary prison of the eurozone
Therefore, the question of an exit from the eurozone and of a break with the neoliberal policies and choices of the EU, which has been following an ever more reactionary and anti-democratic trajectory, will be placed on the agenda not as the product of some ideological obsession but in terms of basic political realism.
(…)
Whatever the inevitable difficulties of the first months, nothing justifies the stance of those Cassandras who equate such a move with economic disaster and national ruin. In the course of the twentieth century, sixty-nine monetary unions collapsed on this planet without this signifying the end of the world. The introduction of a national currency as a prerequisite for implementation of a progressive program for reconstruction and a way forward is not only a viable option; it is an option of hope, with the potential to launch the country on a new developmental trajectory.
(…)
Attainment of monetary sovereignty, with de-linkage of the Bank of Greece from the ECB, and its operation with governmental, public, and social accountability and with issuance of a national currency, will provide us with the necessary liquidity in the economy, without the onerous burden of the loan agreements.
It will be of great assistance in strengthening exports, limiting and gradually substituting local products for imports, invigorating the country’s productive base and tourist inflow. It will foster job creation through a program of necessary public productive investments, developmental initiatives from the big publicly owned enterprises, support for the social sector of the economy, and restoration of credit for small and medium businesses. Abolition of the unjust taxation and other burdens imposed on lower-income households simply to service the unbearable debt will boost demand and stimulate development.
In sum, we are going to present a special plan for Greece and open it for discussion: a plan for implementing a radical, progressive program with a national currency.”
11 Ikus Awakening the European Left.
Varoufakis:
“Varoufakis has made hundreds of different declarations during this crisis and it’s hard to know what he truly believes in.
I’m far from the only person who thinks that. It’s hard to know what is the opinion of Yanis Varoufakis is on any particular subject.” (…) Yanis Varoufakis has had an incredible career, he’s become a global celebrity on the back of Syriza success. That’s finished, it’s irretrievably gone. All the main actors of this period will be judged very harshly by history because it has been a dramatic failure.
Varoufakis is now, in my reading, trying to rescue his political career, trying to find a new political role for himself in the coming period. But his stock is not high among the Greek left, and internationally there is a lack of trust in what he says. This idea of this European network, or party, will not go very far, I think.”
Plan B:
“… there was no plan and I can prove it. Yanis Varoufakis has himself uploaded on his blog a communication by Jamie Galbraith in which Jamie mentions a phone call to me that took place well after these events were over. Now, Jamie was very closely involved with Yanis at all stages, he was one of his close confidants, he travelled to Greece very frequently.
He states explicitly — as he also told me in that single phone call — that there never was a Plan B. Their group had never formulated a Plan B. In fact he called me to check whether I had developed a plan because they knew that I had been working on these ideas on my own and quite separately from anything that official Syriza was doing. (…) There never was a serious Plan B by the Syriza leadership and the reason is that they were never seriously interested in having one. “
New national currency:
“For Popular Unity the introduction of a new national currency is a means of implementing the radical program the country needs. (…) Popular Unity are the only body in Greek politics which openly and clearly says that a radical program for Greece could not be implemented without a national currency.”
Grexit:
“From the very first moment, back in 2010, when I spoke about Grexit, I said that there could be two types of exit, progressive and conservative. Exit could certainly happen in a conservative way, they could even roll the tanks out. But I have always said that this has nothing to do with the Left, whose aim must be to achieve progressive exit. (…) The Left should aim to change the currency not because it has a fetish about money, but because it appreciates that money is the pinnacle of a set of institutions representing class and, the case of the euro, national domination. To change the currency there would have to be class struggle that would alter these institutions and implement social change.
This is at core an argument about the rebirth of the Left in Europe and the re-founding of socialism for the 21st century. That has always been the project for me.
Changing the currency in Greece and altering the monetary arrangements of Europe would require so many things to be changed that it would offer the chance of profound social transformation in favour of labor and against capital.
To be more specific, to change the currency, it would be necessary to have a debt write-off. But a debt write-off is a class question par excellence as well as bringing to the fore the question of dominant and subordinate countries in Europe.
To change the currency, it would also be necessary to lift austerity. But lifting austerity means attacking finance capital and reversing financialization in a most decisive way. It also means altering the direction of fiscal policy to serve the interests of the working people by reducing unemployment. These are class issues again.
To change the currency, it would further be necessary to nationalize the banks and put them under proper public administration, while implementing a debt write-off for household and business debts. This is again a class issue.
To change the currency, not least, would require a development program for Greece that would redirect development away from the problematic path of financialization and would restrengthen agricultural and industrial production. That again is a matter of class struggle that ought to be resolved in the interests of labor.
To change the currency, finally, it would be necessary to transform the state to allow intervention in the economy in the interests of labor, while strengthening democratic rights.”