Albistea: A Greek conspiracy: How the ECB crushed Varoufakis’ plans1
(a) Istorioa ala historia?
Greziako Banku Zentraleko zuzendari bat eta EBZ-rekiko negoziazio estrategiaren sabotaia2
(b) Gertaeren dokumentazioak dioena3
(c) Gogoratzekoa4
(d) Tsipras eta Varoufakis5
(e) Euklid Tsakalotos, Yanis Stoumaras eta Denise Gibson6
(f) Beraz,
“The former chief negotiator of the Greek government is and was a close friend of the central bank governor and the central bank governor was the boss of his wife. The governor of the Bank of Greece, which is part of the Eurosystem of central banks, gets his orders from the ECB, i.e. the opposing side in the negotiations. He actively sabotaged the negotiation strategy of his government.”
Baina konspirazioetatik at, teoria sendo bat dago langabeziaren eta politika fiskalaren arteko loturaz:
(1) Twitterrak:
IDEAeconomics @IDEAeconomics urt. 21
Steve Keen’s Kingston Inaugural Professorial Lecture (with slides and models) http://www.debtdeflation.com/blogs/2016/01/16/my-kingston-inaugural-lecture-with-slides-and-data/ …
2016 urt. 20
Warren B. Mosler @wbmosler urt. 21
@IDEAeconomics @FadhelKaboub It remains that a fiscal adjustment can always be used to eliminate unemployment
(2) Greziako orakuluak ez du ezer ikasi:
Yanis Varoufakis-i egindako elkarrizketa, 2016an:7
- ¿Y usted cómo resolvería esta crisis que ya dura seis años? ¿No podría ser el Grexit la solución?
- La solución sólo puede llegar si se aceptan las propuestas y la filosofía que nosotros hicimos en mayo (basadas en el documento titulado ‘Políticas Marco para la Consolidación Fiscal de Grecia, Recuperación y Desarrollo’). No hay otro camino. Y nada de aquello contempla el Grexit. El Grexit fue una amenaza utilizada por la troika para forzar al primer ministro griego a capitular en un memorándum que está diseñado para fracasar.
Goian aipatu bezala, orakulua ez zen enteratu ere ez Greziako gora beheraz!
Teoriaz ez zuen jakin eta ez daki. Izan ere, gogoratu ondoko hauek:
Warren Mosler eta A Modest Response
Grexit: elkarrizketak, zurrumurruak, erdi egiak, gezur potoloak, eta are gehiago…
Are gehiago, Bill Mitchell-en arabera,
Europako demokraziak eurogunea apurtu behar du
Grexit oso labur geratu da:
(3) Europako orakuluak ere ez du deus ikasi.
2012an:
M. Draghi (EBZ-ko presidentea) eta W. Mosler
2013an:
2015ean:
QE: Mosler eta Draghi, berriz…
EBZko orakulua (aka Mario Draghi) eta Warren Mosler
2016an:
(4) Gehigarriak:
(a) Litekeena ote eurogunean austeritatearekin bukatzea?
(b) Warren Mosler-i egindako elkarrizketa:
Ikus Elkarrizketa W. Mosler-ekin,
eta elkarrizketa bera ondoko linketan:
Elkarrizketa W. Mosler-ekin (zenbait zipriztin-1)
Elkarrizketa W. Mosler-ekin (zenbait zipriztin-2) eta
Elkarrizketa W. Mosler-ekin (zenbait zipriztin- eta 3)
(4) Eta Euskal Herrian, zer?
i) Alde batetik, ezjakintasuna
Ezjakintasunak hedatuz segitzen du, etengabe!
ii) Bestetik, Madrilera begira!
In Urtarrilak 3: Katalunia, CUP eta Euskal Herria
“Austeritatearen aurka Espainia una, grande y libre-n? Madrilera begira? Zertarako?
Irakur Bill Mitchell-en azken lantxoa: Spain in limbo but has not rejected austerity (http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=32695):
“…Above all, Podemos no longer advocates an exit of from the Eurozone nor the introduction of income guarantees.
When they released their modelling on their basic income proposal it was clear that the policy overall was not compatible with remaining in the Eurozone. It was the same inconsistency that Syriza presented the Greek people – we will abandon austerity and reverse the damage but stay in the Eurozone which prevents a nation from abandoning austerity.
(…)
Syriza didn’t crumble because Greece is too small. It abandoned its anti-austerity because it refused to countenance and exit from the Eurozone and once the Commission knew that they had all the power.
It would be the same if Podemos had have won more votes and more seats. The public must be educated first as to how damaging the Euro membership is.
How it is equivalent to austerity.
A nation cannot have the euro and pursue and anti-austerity stance.
And, Alexis Tsipris was wrong – again. Austerity was not defeated in the Spanish national election on December 20, 2015.”
Euskal Herriak ideien, proposamenen eta politiken zeruan segitzen du, linbon baino askoz seguruago, alegia, benetako paradisuaz amesten: euroguneko paradisua, noski.
Aipatu ote dugu inoiz, ezjakintasuna oso ausarta denik? Ikus Baledi eta balitz, Grexit dela eta.”
Ikasiko ote dugu inoiz?
Dudatan segitzen dut.
1 Ikus: https://rwer.wordpress.com/2016/01/22/a-greek-conspiracy-how-the-ecb-crushed-varoufakis-plans/.
2 Ingelesez: “A central bank governor in Athens conspires with the President of the Republic to sabotage the negotiation strategy of his government to weaken it in its negotiations with the European Central Bank. After the government has capitulated, this governor, who is a close friend of the new finance minister and boss of the finance ministers wife, and the President of the Republic travel together to the ECB to collect their praise and rewards. This is not an invention, this is now documented.”
3 Ingelesez: “On 19 January the German Central Bank in Frankfurt informed the media that the Greek President Prokopis Pavlopoulos visited the ECB and met with ECB-President Mario Draghi, and that he was accompanied by the President of the Greek central Bank, Yanis Stournaras.”
4 Ingelesez: “Remember. When the Syriza-led government in Athens was in tense negotiations with the European institutions, the ECB excerted pressure by cutting Greek banks off the regular financing operations with the ECB. They could get euros only via Emergency Liquidty Assistance from the Greek central bank and the ECB placed a strict limit on these. Finance minister Yanis Varoufakis worked on emergency plans to keep the payment system going in case the ECB would cut off the euro supply completely.”
5 Ingelesez: “It has already been reported and discussed that a close aide of Stournaras sabotaged the government during this time by sending a memo to a financial journalist, which was very critical with the governments negotiation tactics and blamed it for the troubles of the banks, which the ECB had intensified, if not provoked.
A few days ago, Stournaras himself exposed a conspiracy. He bragged that he had convened former prime ministers and talked to the President of the Republic to raise a wall blocking Varoufakis’ emergency plan.
In retrospect it looks as if Alexis Tsipras might have signed his capitulation to Stournaras and the ECB already in April 2015, when he replaced Varoufakis as chief negotiator by Euklid Tsakalotos, who would later become finance minister after Varoufakis resigned. In this case the nightly negotiating marathon in July, after which Tsipras publicly signed his capitulation, might just have been a show to demonstrate that he fought bravely to the end.”
6 Ingelesez: “… I learned in a Handelsblatt-Interview with Tsakalotos published on 15 January 2016 that he is a close friend of Stournaras. Looking around a bit more, I learned that Tsakalotos wife is “Director Advisor” to the Bank of Greece.”
