Andrea Terzi-ren hiru lan interesgarri:
(a) When Good Intentions Pave the Road to Hell: Monetization Fears and Europe’s Narrowing Options1
Zipriztinak:
(i) Eurozonaren berezitasuna: EBZ-k ezin du gobernuaren zorra monetizatu2
(ii) Salbuespenak onartu ziren 2012an: estatu kideek jaulkitako bonoak babestuz3
(iii) Proposaturiko irtenbidea, Europako gobernu federala eratu barik: euroguneari nahiko gastu netoa permititzea, sektore pribatuak eskari agregatu handiagoa eta lanpostuen sormena sostengatzeko
(Gogoratu W. Mosler-ek aspaldian proposatutakoa: Warren Mosler-en proposamenak, Proposamen zehatza. Mosler-en eskutik, berriz eta Mosler-en proposamena Eurolandiarako)
(iv) Horretarako eurobono bat jaulkitzea nahiko litzateke4
(Gogoratu Mosler bonoak: Europar Batasuneko eta EBko estatu desberdinetako bonoak. Mosler bonoak)
(v) Fondoak Europar Batasuneko gobernuei transferituak izango lirateke pro quota, programa fiskalak sostengatzeko5
(Aipatu bezala, beste hitzetan esanda, Mosler-ek planteatu zituen antzeko proposamenak, modu dotore batez.)
(Segituko du)
1 Ikus http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_810.pdf.
2 Ingelesez: “The key provision in the eurozone, however, is not that of prohibiting the ECB from directly financing governments. This same provision exists in the United States and it does not make US government securities defaultable: By acting as market maker of Federal debt, the Fed has the option to stand ready to convert “forward central bank money” (government debt) into “spot central bank money” (banks’ balances at the central bank) on demand, at the chosen policy rate. Unsurprisingly, the US government can default only by deliberate repudiation. Eurozone debt was instead made defaultable through the prohibition that the ECB monetize eurozone government debt.”
3 Ingelesez: “When such a threat developed in 2012, the ECB had no other option than to offer some form of protection to government bonds issued by member states. There is no reason to doubt that the ECB was fully aware that monetary financing prohibitions such as those included in the Treaty on European Union can play “a key role in deepening the crisis” when it started the SMP and then announced the creation of OMTs. The ECB prevented the collapse of the payment system by making an exception to the “no monetization” rule. The exception was justified by the fact that the euro was on the brink of collapse and without such a move the entire eurozone would be at risk of imploding.“
4 Ingelesez: It is sufficient that the EU agree on:
a) issuing a eurobond, conceivably through the European Stability Mechanism, that the ECB will have the option to trade at the chosen policy rate;
b) using the revenue obtained from the eurobond issue to fund an increase in net government spending, of an overall size agreed upon at the EU level, directed to all countries in proportionate shares;
c) excluding such increase in net government spending from the calculation of national public deficit ceilings. “
5 Ingelesez: “Funds will be transferred to EU governments pro quota, only and exclusively to support fiscal programs that are acknowledged to be in the common interest of the EU. Net government spending could be raised either with spending programs or with a tax cut across the board that the EU deems is “in the interest of Europe.”
The task of policy makers is to prepare the political ground for restoring aggregate demand and job creation, but they should not fear the new eurobond, as there is nothing to fear. It is just the missing element of a common policy that would provide growth and employment in Europe.”
