ICEC-Euskal Herria eta Warren Mosler (segida)

Iruzkinak (2)

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  joseba says:

  2017/06/15 at 07:00

  Gehigarria:

  Ekonomia berria (in Independentziaren garaia politikan eta ekonomian)

  Politika berriak ekonomia berria eskatzen du.

  Arlo ekonomikoan ‘gauzak’ argi samar daude; gutxienez, batzuek argi daukagu afera.

  Oso ongi dakigunez,

  Europar Batasun osorako, irtenbide bakarra defizit publikoa handitzea da.

  Gogoratu Warren Mosler: Warren Mosler-en proposamenak

  EBZ-k ezetza ematekotan, Lexit eta moneta propioa, moneta berriarekin defizit publikoa handituz.

  Hortaz,

  Lehengo moneta (euroa) erabiliz gero, baldin eta defizit publikoen handitzea (%3tik %8ra igoz) ahalbidetzen bada, primeran…

  Ezezkoan, moneta propioa erabiliz (kasu, EHn eusko berria), gauza berbera: defizit publikoa handitzea.

  EHko Banku zentral eta Altxor publiko berriak ongi kudeatzeko, hona hemen, Mosler-en ustez, hartu behar den lehen neurria: EHko banku zentralaren interes tasak zero edo ia zero izan behar dira, betiko!

  Interes tasak zerotik oso hurbil egon beharko lirateke, betiko

  (Ingelesez: Federal Reserve Interest Rates Should Be Near Zero Forever: https://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-the-federal-reserve-keep-interest-rates-low/federal-reserve-interest-rates-should-be-at-zero-forever. )

• 

  joseba says:

  2017/06/21 at 06:11

  EB: ez dago soluziorik bistan

  Bill Mitchell-en Deepening the Economic and Monetary Union – no solution in sight

  http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=36270

  … I considered that there is a single answer to the problem despite the millions of words that the European Commission has published over the last several years, which duck and weave around that solution.
  The single answer is that for the Eurozone to work it must become a true federation, with a European-level fiscal capacity to ensure that total spending in the Eurozone is sufficient to generate enough jobs to satisfy the desire of the workers is assessed.
  The various hybrid schemes that have been proposed by economists in Europe and beyond (unemployment insurance, special blue bonds and the like) will not be sufficient.
  That fiscal capacity has to be embedded within the European Parliament to give the policy regime democratic legitimacy. In other words, the European Council, European Commission would not be responsible for Eurozone-wide fiscal policy.
  Further, the cult of austerity which biases fiscal policy towards fiscal surplus without regard to the economic circumstances (for example, the state of the labour market) has to be abandoned.
  That austerity bias arises because there is a lack of trust among the Member States, something that has been long developed in history and will not change.
  The lack of trust and a lack of collective will means that fiscal policy is reduced to being largely pro-cyclical in impact (net government spending falls at the same time as the non-government cycle is contracting) which is the anathema of responsible fiscal policy design and practice.
  The ECB also would have to become an integrated part of this new federal government economic capacity, which means policies such as overt monetary financing (OMF) would have to be available. That requires a major shift in thinking and Treaty design and means that the ‘Monetary pillar’ is far from “well developed”.
  This federal fiscal capacity would have to allow for the possibility and likelihood of continuous fiscal deficits separate from the automatic stabiliser component – that is full employment deficits – which would allow the non-government sector to save overall and for nations to cope with drains coming from external deficits.
  All the suggestions that have been made by the European Commission to date (unemployment insurance, public investment insurance) are all predicated on fiscal neutrality – balanced fiscal positions. In other words, any stimulus in a downturn would have to be paid back in an upturn.
  The problem is that a balanced fiscal position (deficit equal to zero) may not be (and is most likely not) the most appropriate long-term position for a nation seeking full employment and prosperity and in trying to impose such balance usually results in fiscal policy becoming pro-cyclical.

  (…)
  … the differences between the European nations are so great that such a shift towards a true federation is highly unlikely despite the fact that the EMU could function effectively if the capacity was developed.
  The other conclusion is that by failing to solve the inherent design problem either by introducing a full federal fiscal capacity or disbanding the monetary union, the European Commission is setting the Eurozone up for the next crisis.
  While there is some growth now, after nearly a decade of malaise, the residual damage from the crisis remains. The private sector still has elevated levels of debt, the banking system is far from recovered (particularly in Italy), the property market is still depressed, governments have elevated levels of foreign-currency debt (euros), and the labour market remains depressed.
  What that means is that when the next economic downturn comes – and economic cycles repeat – the crisis will be magnified and the mechanisms set in place as emergency measures to deal with the GFC will fail immediately.
  It is only a matter of time.